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Abstract 
We analyse the stability of the cross-market shock transmission mechanism between 
banks and sovereign bonds during the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis for crisis-hit 
periphery countries and Germany. We also examine the shock propagation of banking 
shocks and sovereign bond shocks between domestic and external markets. Using a 
Markov-switching framework, we find strong evidence of bilateral contagion between 
banks and sovereign bonds and also between domestic and external banking sectors. 
Sovereign bond markets are different. An external shock only produces contagious 
effects in Greece, who were largely dependent on external aid. For all the others, external 
shocks lead to decoupling as investors became increasingly discerning in their perception 
of the debt instruments issued by different Eurozone states. 
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I. Introduction
The relationship between banks and sovereign bonds has attracted a great deal of attention
following the financial crises that occurred in both the banking industry and Eurozone sovereign
bond markets between 2008 and 2011. Indeed this relationship is likely to come under scrutiny yet
again as the global financial system enters another crisis due to COVID-19 virus of 2019/20. Terms
such as the ’deadly embrace’ of Fahri and Tirole (2018), the ’diabolical loop’ of Brunnermeier
et al. (2016) and ’dangerous liaisons’ of Candelon and Palm (2010) reflect the severe financial
consequences of a simultaneous decline in both bank and soverign bond markets. An extensive
literature demonstrates how, in times of crisis, a negative spiral may arise between banks and
sovereign bonds, with shocks to either adversely affecting the other and exacerbating an already
distressed situation. Acharya et al. (2014) and Mody and Sandri (2012) model an ’Irish-style’
crisis where the trigger for the crisis arises from the declining financial state of domestic banks.
Government bailouts of these distressed banks, and/or guarantees to their debt holders, result
in a transfer of risk from private banks to the sovereign. The repercussion for the sovereign is
a reduced ability to borrow at competitive rates, which in turn, reduces the credibility of its
guarantees. Hence, the fortunes of the two sectors become inextricably linked. Indeed, by 2008 net
indebtedness of Irish banks to the rest of the world was 60% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
and, following increased pressure on the banking system, in September of that year the Irish
government provided exceptional support in the form of a comprehensive State Guarantee for the
liabilities of the Irish domestic banking system (Central Bank of Ireland report, 2010).
A similar negative spiral is identified by Bocola (2016) and Sosa-Padilla (2018) who focus on a
’Greek-style’ crisis. The difference is the trigger for the crisis, with the financial distress erupting
from declining public finances. 1 Domestic banks become entangled in the crisis through their
holdings of domestic sovereign bonds (balance-sheet channel). As these bonds fall in value and
often become increasingly illiquid (liquidity channel), the balance sheet of the domestic banking
sector contracts, restricting their ability to borrow on external markets and increasing their risk
1For example, Greek government debt was 172% of GDP in 2011.
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premium (price channel)2 and, with it, the likelihood of requiring a government bailout. 3 Fahri
and Tirole (2018) and Cooper and Nikolov (2018) both demonstrate how feedback loops between
banks and sovereigns serve to aggravate downturns in either market.
A related, but distinct, literature on the role of contagion in propagating the crisis also grew
rapidly following the crisis years. A large volume of papers has focused exclusively on contagion
within European sovereign bond markets. The results are mixed and this may be due to a variety
of reason such as methodology used, the time period of the study and the identified source of
the shock. Both Arezki et al. (2011) and Alfonso et al. (2012) show that downgrades to sovereign
bond credit ratings caused spillovers to the other sovereign bonds of the Eurozone member states.
Mink and de Haan (2013) focus solely on Greek shocks and find evidence that the sovereign bond
spreads of the other GIIPS countries all react to news emerging from the Greek market. Likewise
Bird et al. (2017) find that Greek shocks were contagious to other peripheral markets during the
crisis. Similarly, Metiu (2012) and Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2012) both find strong evidence
of contagion during the early part of the Eurozone crisis, with the former finding contagion
emanating from all GIIPS and the latter showing that Greece was the initial source of contagion
but that later, all GIIPS contributed to the contagious transmission of shocks. Another group of
studies find a limited role for contagion. Both Beirne and Fratzscher (2013) and Claeys and Vašíček
(2014) conclude that contagion played a role in shock transmission but only for short, intense
periods. Cronin et al. (2016) show that the sources of contagion differed between two distinct
periods of the crisis and were not exclusive to peripheral markets. Blatt et al. (2015) find that
Greek bond shocks do not generate contagion for its fellow member states but its shocks propagate
through a change in dynamics. However, shocks originating in Italy, Spain and Portugal are
found to be potentially contagious (with immediate effects) to other Eurozone countries. Finally,
studies such as Philippas and Siriopoulos (2013) and Pragidis et al. (2015) find no evidence of
2Albertazzi et al. (2014) discuss the three channels through which sovereign bond shocks may propagate to domestic
banks and present empirical evidence consistent with these types of transmission for the Italian economy.
3In a related literature, though not exclusive to a crisis period, Acharya and Rajan (2013) and Gennaioli et al. (2014)
both highlight the interdependence between sovereign bond markets and the domestic banking sector and show that
governments strive to avoid defaulting on its debt due to the adverse effect it would have on the domestic financial sector.
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contagion from Greece to the other Eurozone member states, while Caporin et al. (2013) attribute
the transmission of shocks in Eurozone bond markets to interdependencies rather than contagion.
The literature on the role of contagion in the spread on the banking crisis of 2007-09 similarly
attracted a great deal of attention but produced a more conclusive result. In general, studies
find evidence of contagion across the global banking sector, irrespective of sample period or
methodology (see, Dungey and Gajurel, 2015 and Fry-McKibbin and Hsaio, 2018 for contagion
emanating from U.S. banks; Gropp et al., 2009 for European banks; and Ahrend and Goujard, 2015
and Dungey et al., 2020 for contagion across the global banking sector).
A third strand of this literature examines the presence of contagion between banks and
sovereign bonds. De Bruyckere et al. (2013) find evidence of excess correlation between the two
sectors during the crisis, while Allegret et al. (2017) find evidence of contagious effects from
sovereign bonds to the European banking sector. Georgoutsos and Moratis (2017) present evidence
of contagion between banks and sovereigns but suggest that the nature of this contagion changed
between the global banking crisis of 2007-09 and the post-2010 Eurozone sovereign debt crisis.
We re-visit the issue of contagion by examining the stability of relationships across market
conditions. We test for contagion within sovereign bond markets, within the banking industry, and
between banks and sovereign bonds under one unified framework. Furthermore, we distinguish
between the source of the shock between domestic and external markets for both banks and bonds,
which allows us to capture any changes in the transmission of domestic and global bank shocks as
well as domestic and external bond shocks for each country analyzed. We focus on the European
periphery countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) that bore the brunt of financial
crisis and also include Germany as a benchmark case. To empirically capture these potential effects,
we adopt the methodology of Dungey et al. (2020) and extend it to a three-regime setting. Changes
in asset/market relationships across market conditions are detected as statistically significant
differences between regime-dependent impulse response functions.4 Contagion is defined as an
intensification of the relationship, i.e. a strong response in a crisis regime, while a weakening of
the relationship (a smaller-than-expected response during the crisis) is labelled as decoupling.
4Erhmann et al. (2003) introduce the concept of regime-dependent impulse response functions.
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No change in the relationship across market conditions implies that shock transmission was
simply due to interdependence or pre-existing linkages. Similar definitions are widely used in
the extant literature since Forbes and Rigobon (2002) first distinguished between contagion and
interdependence.
Our results have a number of interesting features. Firstly, this turbulent period is best modelled
in a three-regime setting, with two distinct phases of the crisis. Secondly, during both phases
of the crisis, there is strong evidence of contagion within the banking sector with evidence of
strong transmission of global shocks to domestic sectors and also of domestic shocks affecting the
global industry. Likewise both global and domestic bank shocks give rise to contagious effects for
the sovereign bond markets of the Eurozone periphery countries. Shocks that originate in these
sovereign bond markets also illicit stronger responses from their domestic banking sectors during
a crisis, though the strong positive response are generally only observed during the intense phase
of the crisis. Finally, within the Eurozone sovereign bond markets, we observe a great deal of
decoupling, i.e. a weakening of relationships following a shock. Bonds appear to be less responsive
to shocks in neighbouring bond markets during the crisis, whether common or country-specific,
suggesting that this increased idiosyncratic behaviour could be due to investors differentiating
more between the sovereign bonds of these countries, treating them more as heterogeneous rather
than homogeneous securities.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the data, outlines our
econometric methodology and discusses our model specification, Section 3 reports and discusses
our results. Finally, Section 4 contains our concluding remarks.
II. Data and Econometric Methodology
II.1 Data
In this analysis, we use daily banking returns for 13 countries. These are mainly Eurozone
countries but we also include the U.S., the U.K. and Japan to capture global banking conditions
over our sample. We use Datastream constructed national banking indices for consistency in
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their construction. We employ returns on a constant maturity 10-year sovereign bond for Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain (GIIPS) to represent sovereign bond market conditions in these
crisis-hit countries and we also include Germany as a benchmark, due its consistently low yield.
Once again, these bond indices are constructed by Datastream. Global market conditions are
captured through the inclusion of a Datastream-constructed world market portfolio and liquidity
conditions are proxied by the TED spread (difference between the three-month LIBOR rate and the
rate on three-month U.S. government Treasury bills), which is sourced from the database of the
Federal Reserve Board. Our sample covers the period from January 1, 2004 to December 31, 2017.
The starting point is chosen to avoid any contamination from earlier crises such as the bursting of
the Dot.com bubble, the collapse of the Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) hedge fund or
the Latin-American bond crisis.
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the daily log returns of the banking sectors and for a
constant-maturity 10-year sovereign bond of each of the countries analysed.5
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Turning first to the banking sector statistics, Table 1 reports that negative mean returns for all
countries apart from Austria, Belgium, France, Spain, Japan and the United States, with Ireland
and Greece displaying the highest negative returns. This is unsurprising given the severity of the
banking crises experienced in those countries over the sample period. The high volatility of returns
indicated by their variances also indicates this. The majority of banking returns are negatively
skewed and all experience excess kurtosis, so we reject normality in all cases. The Netherlands
stands out in terms of skewness and kurtosis. The Dutch banking system lost approximately e27
million in 2008 and many large banks active in international markets required assistance, such as
ING receiving e10 million on 19th October. The Dutch banking index experienced a large drop
on October 14th 2008, which coincides with the approval of the debt guarantee scheme in the
Netherlands, as well as a lot of volatility in markets, evidenced by the high variance of the series.
In terms of the sovereign bonds under consideration, Table 1 reports that returns all are mean
5The Datastream mnemonic for the banking sector indices and sovereign bond indices are BANKS+CC and BM10Y+CC
respectively, where CC is a country code.
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positive, which is expected for long term government bonds. The severity of the Greek crisis is
indicated by its high relative variance, while all GIIPS countries bond returns apart from Portugal
are positively skewed and all GIIPS display high excess kurtosis, thus we reject normality in these
cases.
II.2 The econometric methodology
To address the issue of the stability of shock transmission, we employ the methodology of Dungey
et al. (2020), who analyze regime-dependent generalized impulse response functions (GIRFs)
to detect if cross-asset responses to a given shock are consistent with market interdependence,
contagion or decoupling. In their paper, the empirical application focuses on a two-regime setting
but we extend the methodology here to allow for three regimes since there is evidence that the
Eurozone sovereign bond crisis is better characterised by different phases rather than a single
homogeneous crisis regime, e.g. see Cronin et al. (2016) and Bird et al. (2017).
Dungey et al. (2020) propose a Markov-switching factor-augmented VAR (MS-FAVAR) model
to analyze the stability of asset market linkages across different market conditions. The factor(s)
allow parsimonious representation of a larger system, such as the global banking industry or
external Eurozone sovereign bond markets in this application.6 The econometric model is specified
as:
yi,t = α(st) +
K
∑
k=1
βk(st)yi,t−k + εsti,t, (1)
st ∈ {1, 2, 3} ,
εsti,t ∼ i.i.d.N(0, σ2s ),
where yi,t is an n dimensional time series vector of dependent variables, α is a matrix of state
dependent intercepts, β1 . . . βk are matrices of the state dependent autoregressive coefficients
and capture the relationships between our variables, and εsti,t is a state dependent noise vector,
which has a zero mean and constant variance within each regime. st is an unobserved random
variable that signals the switch from regime to another. Since the true regime cannot be observed,
6Bernanke et al. (2005) originally introduced the FAVAR to reduce the dimensionality of monetary policy models; while
the methodology has also been applied in finance by Claeys and Vasicek (2014).
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we must specify the paths by which the regimes transit from one to another. We assume st follows
a first-order Markov process in which the current regime, st relies only on the regime one period
in the past, st−1.
II.3 Our model specification
We seek to model the relationships between the domestic banking sector, the domestic sovereign
bond market and the external banking and sovereign bond markets for the crisis-hit GIIPS
countries. Due to the intractability of including all potentially relevant external variables, we
propose to capture these external effects through the inclusion of two factors; one to capture global
banking conditions and the other to capture conditions in the GIIPS sovereign bond markets.
It could be argued that the external bond factor could cover more markets but we feel that the
greatest turmoil emanated from the sovereign bond markets of the peripheral Eurozone states and
there is ample evidence that many investors held long positions in the sovereign bonds of these
countries in the immediate run-up to the financial crisis, e.g. see Acharya and Steffen (2015).
Consequently, in our analysis of country i, the global banking shock is proxied by a common
shock extracted from the banking returns of the other nine (non-domestic) Eurozone countries plus
Japan, the UK and the US. The US and the UK are included as they both suffered major shocks to
their banking industries and contributed significantly to the widespread turmoil experienced by
the sector. To capture the shock component of the returns, we first run a standard VAR model of
the returns and retrieve the vector of residuals. We then perform a principal components based
factor analysis of the correlation matrix of residuals and use the first principal component as our
common external shock. The GIIPS bond factor is extracted in a similar fashion. In the model of
country i, the bond factor is the first principal component of the sovereign bond return shocks of
the GIIPS countries, excluding the country being analyzed. The domestic stock and bond return
shocks are proxied by the residuals from a first-order VAR with the return on the world market
portfolio and the change in the TED spread included as exogenous regressors to control for global
market events. Thus, yi,t in our application is a 4x1 vector of dependent variables comprising
of the global bank factor, the domestic bank return, the GIIPS bond factor, and the domestic
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sovereign bond return. The conditional probability of moving from regime i to j is given by
Pr[st = j|st−1 = i] = pij. (2)
The model is estimated using a Bayesian Markov-chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) approach. We
first specify the prior distributions for the parameters. For the variances, we employ a Wishart
distribution, the VAR coefficients have a flat prior and we use a weak Dirichlet prior for the
transitions, with a preference towards remaining in the same state. Using Gibbs sampling, we
estimate the parameters and regimes in the following sequence;
Step 1: We draw the sigmas, given the mean coefficients and regimes.
Step 2: We draw the mean coefficients (α and β) given sigmas and regimes.
Step 3: We draw the regimes, given the sigmas and mean coefficients.
Step 4: We draw the transition parameters.
This sequence of steps is repeated 10, 000 times after discarding an initial burn-in set of 2, 000
replications. Once we have obtained our estimated parameters, we generate the regime-dependent
GIRFs and their associated confidence bands. We interpret a statistically significant increase in the
response of variable j to a shock to variable i in the crisis regime as contagion from i to j. On the
other hand, a statistically significant decrease constitutes decoupling. If the GIRF is unchanged
between regimes, this is interdependence.
III. Discussion of Results
We estimate the three-regime specification of the model for each of the GIIPS countries, along
with Germany as a benchmark case. The regimes are labelled ’Normal’, ’Crisis’ and ’Intense
Crisis’. Figure 1 shows the probabilities for the occurrence of each regime across countries. It
is notable that in all countries, ’Normal’ market conditions prevailed for the early part of the
sample and switched to a sustained period of increased volatility about 2008. From there until the
end of the sample, the markets have switched between two crisis phases. The U.S. credit crisis of
2007-2009 sparked a short but intense period of volatility in both Ireland and Spain but had less
repercussions for Greece and Portugal. Germany is different from the GIIPS countries. Its more
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intense phase of the crisis coincides with 2007-09 U.S. credit and subsequent global banking crisis,
while the GIIPS all suffer their highest volatility regime later, during 2011-12 and later again in
2015 when the Eurozone sovereign bond crisis threatened to overwhelm the single currency zone
and funding issues came to head, particularly for Greece.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Table 2 presents the main features of each regime. Across the GIIPS, there is a substantial increase
in volatility, for both the banking sector and sovereign bonds, as we move from the ’Normal’
to the ’Crisis’ regime before reaching its highest levels during the ’Intense Crisis’. Germany is
clearly different with a relatively small increase in volatility between the two phases of the crisis.
Banking stock returns are never statistically different from zero but typically exhibit a negative
sign with the magnitudes of expected returns increasing as we enter the crisis regimes. During
the ’Intense Crisis’ the Greek banking sector experiences the most negative expected return, which
is unsurprising given the trauma its banking system faced over the sample period. Banking stocks
in Spain and Ireland appear to be already rebounding during this intense period as their banking
sectors had suffered their greatest losses earlier during the U.S. credit and liquidity crisis period.
However, these returns remain statistically indistinguishable from zero.
Sovereign bond returns are also not statistically different from zero and their magnitude is
relatively small and change little across regimes.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Table 3 presents the transition probabilities and duration measures for each phase of the crisis.
Turning first to the transition probabilities, the probability of remaining in the prevailing regime
(denoted by P11, P22 and P33) is high across all countries. Upon exiting the ’Normal’ regime, there
is much higher probability of moving to the ’Crisis’ (P12) rather than the ’Intense Crisis’ (P13)
regime. This is consistent with an evolving crisis, with volatility and uncertainty building over
time and reaching a crescendo into the relatively-short ’Intense’ regime. Once in a crisis, the
probability of transiting to a more intense phase is relatively high (P23), especially for the GIIPS
countries and greatly outweighs the probability of exiting the crisis (P21).
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In terms of duration, ’Crisis’ regimes tend to last longer than ’Intense’ regimes. On average,
across the GIIPS, the duration of the ’Crisis’ and ’Intense’ regimes are about 10 days and 4 days
respectively. These durations are consistent with Kaminsky et al. (2003) who show that episodes
of contagion tend to be ’fast and furious’, with shocks propagating rapidly across the system.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
We analyze the transmission of shocks across regimes to ascertain if asset returns behaved in a
manner consistent with ’Normal’ market conditions during each phase of the crisis (interdepen-
dence) or if markets suffered from contagion or became decoupled during the crisis.
III.1 Transmission of interbank shocks
We begin by analyzing how shocks were transmitted between the global banking industry and the
domestic banking sectors of each country. First we focus on the response of the domestic banking
sector following a shock to the global banking sector. Figure 2 presents the regime-dependent
GIRFs for the six countries. The first notable feature of the transmission of the global shock
is that it only exerts a positive impact on the German and Spanish banking sectors during the
’Normal’ regime. For Greece, Ireland, Italy and Portugal, the effect is either negative or zero. This
probably reflects the relatively small size of these country sectors in the global context. Secondly,
there is clear evidence of contagion in both crisis periods. In both crisis regimes, the response of
the domestic banking sector is always positive (i.e. they move in same direction), implying that
domestic banks were adversely affected by external developments in the sector and declined by
more than could have been anticipated from pre-crisis linkages. Furthermore, the contagion effect
increases as the crisis intensifies in Germany, Greece and Ireland.
[Insert Figures 2 and 3 about here]
We also look at the potential feedback effects by studying the impact on the global banking
industry of shocks originating in the domestic banking sectors of each country. Figure 3 presents
the relevant GIRFs. Once more, the ’Normal’ regime suggests that the smaller markets are not
overly influential in the global banking industry. Shocks to the Greek, Irish, Italian and Portuguese
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banking sectors transmit little or nothing to the global factor, while Spanish shocks result in
positive comovement with the global factor. The pattern is markedly different in both phases of
the crisis, with evidence of contagion from domestic markets to the global industry. However, only
Irish and German shocks exhibit a significantly different transmission between the two phases of
the crisis. Irish shocks generate most contagion during the first phase of the crisis, during which
the Irish banking sector was on the brink of extinction - two of the six indigenous banks became
insolvent during this period resulting in their nationalization and subsequent wind up, while
the four that survived required significant capital injections from the domestic government (see
Connor et al., 2012, for a detailed review of the Irish banking crisis). This increased transmission
suggests that the heightened sensitivity of the distressed global banking sector during this period
resulted in larger than expected responses to adverse shocks originating in relatively small, and
previously relatively unimportant, markets like Ireland. Germany, on the other hand, transmits
stronger contagion during the the later period of the crisis, coinciding with the Eurozone sovereign
debt crisis. During this phase, the exposure of German banks to credit risk in the sovereign bonds
of the Eurozone periphery made them more vulnerable and hence an increased risk factor for the
global sector.
III.2 Transmission of intra-bond market shocks
Next, we turn our attention to the sovereign bond markets and, in particular, the stability of
the propagation of cross-country shocks. First we look at how a shock to the other GIIPS bond
market affects the domestic bond markets of each country, with the relevant GIRFs presented
in Figure 4. During ’Normal’ market conditions, there is a strong positive response to a bond
shock originating in the other peripheral bond markets. This shows that in these tranquil times,
all Eurozone bonds behaved in a similar fashion and were perceived to be close substitutes by
investors (see Achayra and Steffen, 2015). However, as markets transit to the crisis phase, we
observe decoupling across the board and it is most apparent in Spain and Italy. This suggests that
investors began to differentiate more between bonds. The most interesting aspect of this set of
GIRFs is the reaction during the latter phase of the crisis, that is the intense phase for the GIIPS
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and crisis phase for Germany. Firstly, German sovereign bonds completely decouple from the
GIIPS bond shock and exhibit a negative response to shocks in the Eurozone periphery. This is
consistent with German being perceived as a safe haven for Eurozone investors and investors
diverting funds from the Eurozone periphery to German government instruments. At the other
extreme, Greece in its state of financial chaos suffers contagion. Any negative news emanating
from bond markets of the other GIIPS exacerbated the Greek turmoil, possibly due to its heavy
reliance on its Eurozone partners for bailout assistance. In the smaller of the remaining countries,
Ireland and Portugal show no statistical difference in their responses between the two phases
of the crisis, i.e. they remain decoupled relative to normal times. Finally, Spanish and Italian
sovereign bonds become increasingly decoupled (even though the response remains positive),
suggesting that investors perceived these bonds to be of higher-credit quality or, at least, that they
were less likely to default than the other smaller peripheral states.7
[Insert Figures 4 and 5 about here]
Figure 5 examines how a shock in country i is transmitted to the other GIIPS bond markets.
Consistent with Figure 4, there is a strong positive response while ’Normal’ market conditions
prevail and strong evidence of decoupling during the crisis regimes. Again, Germany is different
and the negative response during the latter phase of the crisis reinforces the idea that Germany
acted as a safe haven for bond investors. Among the GIIPS, there is decoupling during both
phases of the crisis and the extent of decoupling depicts a definite ordering on the importance of
domestic shocks for the rest of the Eurozone periphery. Spanish and Italian shocks display the
least levels of decoupling or alternatively, shocks originating in these countries continued to have
a relatively strong influence on the bond returns of the other GIIPS. At the other extreme, Greek
bond shocks had little effect on the sovereign bonds of its Eurozone partners as Greece became
increasingly isolated from the rest. In the middle, there is Ireland, followed by Portugal, whose
shocks continued to exert some influence of the other markets but it continued to decline as the
7Among the GIIPS, Italy and Spain benefited greatly from the ECB asset purchase programmes. For example, as of
December 2012, nearly half of all the outstanding bonds purchased under the Securities Market Programme (SMP) were
Italian bonds. For more details, see European Central Bank Press Release 21 February 2013.
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crisis intensified.
III.3 Transmission of shocks across markets
The cross-market transmission of shocks is analyzed by studying how banking and bond market
shocks affect each other across regimes. We begin by focusing on the propagation of banking
shocks.
III.3.1 Impact of banking shocks on sovereign bond markets
Figures 6 and 7 show the GIRFs for the reaction of each country’s domestic bond in response to a
domestic and global banking shock respectively. There is a similar pattern across both figures.
Firstly, during ’Normal’ market conditions, both domestic and global banking shocks illicit a
negative or zero contemporaneous reaction in sovereign bond markets. This is consistent with
the literature on stock-sovereign bond correlations, which shows that these two asset classes tend
to be negatively correlated when financial markets are calm (see Connolly et al., 2005; Guidolin
and Timmermann, 2006; Anderson et al., 2008; and Flavin et al., 2014 among others). As we
transit into the crisis regime, there is evidence of contagion from the domestic bank shocks across
the GIIPS countries but the response remains relatively muted. In the case of the global bank
shock, though the response is statistically different from the normal regime and hence by strict
definition, constitutes contagion, it is noteworthy that in all cases except Greece the response
remains negative or zero. Thus the sovereign bonds remain largely insulated from the direct effects
of global banking shocks and continued to provide a hedge against global bank shocks, even if
not against domestic bank shocks, during this phase of the crisis. However, in the intense phase of
the crisis, the story is strikingly different with strong evidence of contagion in the transmission
of both domestic and global banking shocks to the sovereign bond markets across the group of
GIIPS. Distress in the domestic and global banking sectors is transmitted to the sovereign bond,
contributing to the negative spiral for these pair of markets.
In both phases of the crisis, German bonds behave differently from those of the Eurozone
periphery. In fact, the response to both domestic and global banking shocks is consistently
13
negative across all market conditions. The response to domestic banking shocks becomes slightly
less negative for the intense phase of the crisis, which strictly speaking meets our definition of
contagion, but in a more holistic sense what we see is that German sovereign bonds provide
diversification benefits for investors in domestic banking stocks.
[Insert Figures 6 and 7 about here]
Figures 8 and 9 depict the response of the GIIPS bond factor (the common reaction across
the non-domestic bonds) to domestic and global banking shocks respectively. There is a very
similar pattern across both Figures so we examine the reactions together. Consistent with the
negative comovement exhibited by equity and bond returns during normal time periods, the
contemporaneous response of the GIIPS bond factor is always negative or zero to a country-specific
bank shock.
This relationship is reversed during both phases of the crisis for all GIIPS countries. Contagion
is a feature of the propagation of the domestic bank shock to the bonds of other peripheral
countries, illustrating the adverse knock-on effects of problems in the domestic banking sector.
This pattern of contagion from banking shocks to sovereign bond markets is consistent with the
analysis of Merton et al. (2013) who highlight the role of government guarantees of banks’ assets
in creating an environment where contagion may occur. They argue that government guarantees,
either implicit or explicit, are akin to a situation where private banks hold a put option written by
the sovereign on bank assets. This lies dormant in ’Normal’ market conditions but is exercised by
banks against the sovereign during crisis periods, creating problems in accessing sovereign bond
markets. Laeven and Valencia (2013) provide estimates of the financial cost of the banking crises
in these and other Eurozone states as domestic governments implemented a range of resolution
programmes to prevent the failure of these private banks. These resolution programmes, in effect,
transferred private debts to the sovereign and these resulted in an adverse transmission to other
countries who were affected by the weakening of the common currency and doubts about its
ability to withstand the crisis.
Germany is again different. During the first phase of the crisis, 2007-09, there is evidence
of contagion as German banks weakened and thereby restricting the supply of private credit
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for some Eurozone sovereign bonds from an important debtor. While there is still evidence of
contagion during the latter regime of the crisis (i.e. the transmission intensifies relative to the
’normal’ regime), the comovement remains negative.
[Insert Figures 8 and 9 about here]
III.3.2 Impact of bond market shocks on banks
Finally, we focus on the stability of the transmission of bond market shocks to the banking
industry. Figures 10 and 11 convey the responses of the domestic banking sector to domestic
and external GIIPS sovereign bond shocks respectively. The pattern that emerges reinforces the
earlier analysis of cross-market shocks. Banks respond to a domestic sovereign bond shock with a
contemporaneous negative reaction during normal regimes, again showing the hedging potential
of equities and sovereign bonds during relatively tranquil episodes (Figure 10). The transition to
the initial phase of the crisis results in contagion for most of the GIIPS, except in Ireland where
this regime sees no change to market linkages, i.e. interdependence. There is strong evidence of
contagion in Greece, where a shock to the domestic bond generated a large contagious effect for
the domestic banking sector. During the intense crisis episode (which largely coincides with the
Eurozone sovereign debt crisis), contagion is rife as weakening domestic bonds hit the balance
sheets of domestic banks and eroded the ability of the sovereign to credibly guarantee the liabilities
of the banking industry. Interestingly, in the case of Greece, the contagion effects from a domestic
bond shock is actually reduced during this regime, possibly due to the fact that the initial crisis
had already caused banks to become so badly impaired that their operations were very restricted.
Once more, Germany merits separate analysis. Domestic sovereign bond shocks always illicit a
negatively signed contemporaneous response from domestic banks regardless of the prevailing
market condition.
[Insert Figures 10 and 11 about here]
Figure 11 shows that domestic banks largely respond in a similar manner to external GIIPS bond
shocks. The most notable exception is that of contagion to German banks during the sovereign
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debt crisis, thereby resulting in evidence of contagion from the sovereign bonds of the Eurozone
periphery to all countries during this period. The importance of this transmission channel can
most likely be attributed to the exposure of domestic banks to the sovereign bonds of the Eurozone
periphery, a phenomenon labelled the ’greatest carry trade ever’ by Acharya and Steffen (2015).
Lastly, we look at the reactions across market conditions of the global banking industry to
shocks to domestic bonds (Figure 12) and the GIIPS bond factor (Figure 13). Global banks behave
like their domestic counterparts in response to a domestic bond shock. There is a negative reaction
to a German bond shock across all market conditions, while the shocks in the GIIPS countries lead
to a negative response during normal market conditions, have little effect during the first phase of
the crisis but propagate contagious effects to the global banking industry during the latter regime
which coincides with the sovereign debt crisis. This contagion may be due, at least in part, to fears
about the sustainability of the Eurozone project itself.
The common shocks of the GIIPS result in a similar pattern (Figure 13), albeit with a little
more sensitivity to the common, non-domestic component of the shock to the bonds of the GIIPS
countries. We find evidence of contagion to German banks during the Eurozone sovereign debt
crisis as banks feared the imposition of haircuts as part of resolution packages being implemented
in Greece particularly. Across the GIIPS, we see an increasing transmission as the crisis intensifies,
generating a contagious effect for the global banking industry across all phases of the crisis.
[Insert Figures 12 and 13 about here]
IV. Conclusions
This analysis examines the stability of shock transmission across market conditions. We focus on
the relationship between banks and sovereign bonds to see whether linkages that pre-dated the
financial crisis could explain the comovement during the period of turbulence. We examine shocks
that originate in both the banking industry and sovereign bond markets and distinguish between
country-specific and external common shocks. We find that market conditions are best captured
by three distinct regimes, implying two distinct phases of the crisis. All the GIIPS countries
exhibit a similar pattern, with an initial ’Crisis’ regime developing into a shorter, more-intense
16
period of turbulence. Our main findings on shock transmission are that pre-existing linkages
cannot explain market responses to shocks and that contagion played a significant role in the
propagation of the crisis within and across the two sectors of the financial system analyzed here.
We provide empirical support for the models of bilateral feedback between banks and sovereigns
and conclude that adversity did bring them closer, though in an undesirable way. However,
we also find evidence of decoupling within sovereign bond markets. Pre-crisis, it appears that
investors viewed Eurozone bonds as homogeneous instruments but this breaks down during the
crisis as bonds behave and perform differently. An interesting hierarchy of investors perception
on credit-worthiness is revealed. At one extreme, German sovereign bonds completely decouple
from those of its neighbours in the Eurozone periphery. It exhibits negative comovement and thus
appears to be a safe haven for investors within Europe. But even within the GIIPS, there is an
interesting pattern of decoupling. Greek bonds exert no influence on the other crisis-hit countries
but are more sensitive to news emanating from other markets. Spanish and Italian sovereign
bonds also decouple but remain idiosyncratic than the bonds of the smaller countries, probably
due to the European Central Bank’s commitment to save the Euro currency and to support the
larger crisis-hit countries through bond purchases.
Overall, we find that the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis was exacerbated by financial contagion
between banks and sovereign debt markets. The crisis wasn’t due to just the magnitude of the
shocks but it was also propagated across markets by an intensification of the shock transmission.
Hence these results provide empirical support for proponents of mechanisms designed to break
these downward spirals and, in particular, the necessity of the state to bailout private domestic
banks. Domestic banks should also better diversify their bond holdings and avoid being overly
exposed to domestic sovereign bonds as their diversification benefits are likely to be reduced
during a financial crisis. Finally, the ECB intervention to avoid explicit bailouts in Spain and
Italy appear to have been, at least partially, successful with the bonds of those countries retaining
more investor confidence that bonds of smaller countries whose unsustainable fiscal positions
had forced them into explicit bailout programmes before the ECB launched its policy of bond
purchase.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Notes: This table reports summary statistics for the daily log returns for the indicated banking sector and
sovereign bond. The sample runs from January 1, 2004, to December 29, 2017.
Banking sector Observations Mean Variance Skewness Kurtosis
Austria 3651 0.0190 4.5726 -0.1969 5.7506
Belgium 3651 0.0005 6.2720 -0.4836 10.685
France 3651 0.0142 4.8474 0.1428 8.5626
Germany 3651 -0.0183 4.2041 -0.0418 9.909
Greece 3651 -0.1940 15.390 -0.7777 11.731
Ireland 3651 -0.0793 16.624 -1.5326 40.684
Italy 3651 -0.0095 4.6973 -0.3851 8.0163
Japan 3651 0.0050 3.2180 0.0272 5.6775
Netherlands 3651 -0.0472 8.5882 -24.073 1050.7
Portugal 3651 -0.0639 4.8100 0.0457 5.3072
Spain 3651 0.0119 3.8070 0.0880 11.034
United Kingdom 3651 -0.0036 3.4010 -0.1790 15.629
United States 3651 0.0106 4.8570 0.1165 19.152
Sovereign Bond Observations Mean Variance Skewness Kurtosis
Germany 3651 0.0212 0.1207 -0.1364 2.1849
Greece 3651 0.0169 3.1140 1.1866 96.001
Ireland 3651 0.0238 0.2773 0.5139 32.075
Italy 3651 0.0240 0.2229 0.5937 16.570
Portugal 3651 0.0277 0.5805 -0.5260 43.036
Spain 3651 0.0244 0.2222 0.8982 14.611
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Table 2: Regime dependent expected returns and volatilities
Notes: This table reports...
Non-crisis regime Crisis Regime Intense Crisis Regime
Banking sector µ σ µ σ µ σ
Germany -0.043 0.739 -0.067 1.355 -0.063 1.981
Greece -0.027 1.211 -0.222 2.725 -0.610 7.324
Ireland -0.059 0.977 -0.186 2.227 0.080 7.378
Italy -0.041 0.753 -0.061 2.663 -0.012 9.132
Portugal -0.007 0.787 -0.102 1.646 -0.137 3.459
Spain -0.057 0.714 -0.049 1.190 0.044 2.527
Non-crisis regime Crisis Regime Intense Crisis Regime
Sovereign Bond µ σ µ σ µ σ
Germany -0.000 0.247 -0.001 0.3815 -0.000 0.370
Greece 0.001 0.247 0.006 0.706 0.033 3.874
Ireland 0.001 0.232 -0.001 0.290 0.004 0.986
Italy 0.000 0.241 0.002 0.329 0.002 0.896
Portugal 0.002 0.245 0.003 0.417 0.002 1.500
Spain 0.001 0.247 0.001 0.346 0.002 0.814
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